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FCPA RISKS FOR U.S. COMPANIES IN
LATIN AMERICA, RENEWABLE ENERGY
THRIVES IN BRAZIL, AND MEXICO AND
THE NEW PRI: ENRIQUE PENA NIETO
Fernando Avelar*
I. FCPA RISKS FOR U.S. COMPANIES IN LATIN AMERICATHE Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has been a point of
increased worry for U.S. companies doing business abroad. React-
ing to FCPA enforcement actions, U.S. companies have imple-
mented advanced compliance programs when dealing with international
subsidiaries and partners.' The recent increase in FCPA enforcement by
the federal government and the multimillion-dollar penalties that have
been levied on U.S. companies for violations of the FCPA 2 are the pre-
dominant reasons companies are in a rush to get their compliance pro-
grams up to par. Latin America is one of the primary areas where U.S.
companies are most at risk for FCPA violations because of the corrupt
culture of business and politics present in many Latin America countries.3
This article is intended to be an overview of anti-corruption law in the
United States and Latin America and to examine why compliance with
the FCPA is more important now than ever.
A. FCPA OVERVIEW
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 with the intended purpose of making it
illegal for certain persons and entities to make payments to foreign gov-
ernment officials in order to obtain new business or retain current busi-
*Fernando Avelar is a third-year law student at SMU Dedman School of Law. He
is currently serving as the Latin America Reporter for the International Law Re-
view Association. He would like to thank his family and friends for the support
they have given him during his time in law school.
1. Matt Ellis, Is the FCPA working? Three dispatches from Latin America, FCPA
COMPIANCE & E-rincs BLOG (Oct. 4, 2011, 7:01 AM), http://tfoxiaw.wordpress.
com/2011/10/04/is-the-fcpa-working-three-dispatches-from-latin-america/.
2. PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P., What You Should Know about the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, DOWma BUSINISS IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (May 2011), http://www.
pwc.com/en US/us/transaction-services/publications/assets/pwc-doing-business-in-
latin-america-foreign-corrupt-practices-act.pdf.
3. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY INT'. (Nov. 2011), http://
cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (click "Download Report").
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ness.4 The FCPA was the response from the U.S. Congress after "more
than 400 US companies admitt[ed] to making questionable or illegal pay-
ments to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties."5
The U.S. Congress wanted to stop the bribery of foreign officials and "re-
store the integrity of American businesses" abroad. 6 Essentially, the
FCPA requires that no officer, director, employee, or agent of a company
shall corruptly offer to pay something of value or give something of value
to any foreign official for the purpose of "(i) influencing any act or deci-
sion of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such for-
eign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of
such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage."7
B. U.S. GOVERNMENT'S Focus ON FCPA VIOLATIONS
One of the main reasons U.S. companies should be worried about po-
tential FCPA violations is the U.S. government's recent focus on ensuring
that U.S. companies are acting as if they were in the United States when
abroad. Since 2005, the agencies responsible for enforcing the FCPA, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), have ramped up their efforts to prosecute companies in viola-
tion of the FCPA.8 The U.S. government decided to substantially
increase the amount of resources dedicated to FCPA enforcement 9 lead-
ing to a record high number of companies being prosecuted for FCPA
violations in 2010.10
In 2004, there were only five enforcement actions conducted by the
SEC and DOJ, while in 2010 their enforcement actions rose to a total of
seventy-four." A reason that may have contributed to the increase in the
number of enforcement actions is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which re-
quires companies to review and report failures in books and records test-
ing, resulting in the detection of more violations.12
The increased focus on FCPA enforcement can be seen in the opening
of new SEC offices focused on enforcement, an increase in FBI agents
focused on enforcement, and financial incentives being offered through
4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP' E OF JusrCiEc, http://www.justice.gov/crim-
inal/fraud/fcpaI (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
5. Doing Business in Latin America, supra note 2, at 2.
6. Id.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A) (2006).
8. Bethany Hengsbach, Aggressive FCPA Enforcement Persists: Increased Activity,
Along With Recent Legal Developments, Mandate that Companies Remain Vigilant,
JDSUPRA (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/aggressive-fcpa-en-
forcement-persists-in-80168/.
9. Id.
10. Thomas R. Fox, FCPA Enforcement: Why the Increase Between the First 25 Years






legislation to whistleblowers.13 With all of the resources and focus being
directed towards enforcement of the FCPA, companies doing business in
Latin America have good reason to be careful.
C. LATIN AMERICA'S RISK OF CORRUPTION
Latin America is of special importance to U.S. companies conducting
business abroad because of its proximity to the United States and its po-
tential for more than 500 million new consumers. 14 In addition to this,
the amount of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Latin American
countries is increasing. The United States now has signed a FTA with the
following Latin American countries: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Do-
minican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicara-
gua, Peru, and Panama.' 5 Significantly, the United States only has
nineteen FTAs and, out of those, ten are with countries from Latin
America.16 The barriers to entry in Latin America for U.S. businesses
are becoming less and less difficult to overcome, creating attractive busi-
ness opportunities for U.S. companies.
Of the FCPA actions brought by the SEC in the past two years, over
half have involved bribery in Latin America.' 7 As mentioned previously,
most Latin American countries have been identified by the Corruption
Perceptions Index as being highly vulnerable to corruption.' 8 Only two
Latin American countries are considered to be on the same level with the
United States, perceived as "very clean."' 9
In addition, recent cases indicate that U.S. companies most at risk for
FCPA violations conduct business in regions where state-owned compa-
nies dominate the market.20 As mentioned previously, "the FCPA pro-
hibits any domestic individual or business entity from making payments
to a 'foreign official' for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business." 21
The FCPA defines "foreign official" as "any officer or employee of a for-
eign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof."22 Thus, "whether an employee of a state-owned company is a
13. Hengsbach, supra note 8.
14. What You Should Know about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 2, at
1.
15. Free Trade Agreements, OICE OF U.S. TRADEI; REPRESENATIVE, http://www.
ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
16. Id.
17. Rose Romero et al., Energy Companies Find Profits, Peril in Latin America, NA-r'Y




18. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, supra note 3.
19. See id.
20. Romero et al., supra note 17.
21. Alison N. Kleaver & Joseph Barton, Meaning Of FCPA's "Foreign Official"
Causes Uncertainty For Companies Doing Business Abroad, LATIN AM. BLOG
(May 24, 2012), http://www.latinolawblog.com/2012/05/articles/fcpa/meaning-of-
fcpas-foreign-official-causes-uncertainty-for-companies-doing-business-abroad/.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A) (2006).
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foreign official depends . . . upon whether state-owned companies are
'instrumentalities,'" but the case law on "instrumentalities" is
convoluted.23
Many of the Latin American countries have large business structures
that are state-owned. "For example, the governments of Brazil, Colom-
bia, Mexico and Venezuela wholly own the oil companies in their respec-
tive countries," thus making it difficult to know when a U.S. company is
more at risk for FCPA violations. 2 4
The lack of anti-bribery and anti-corruption laws in Latin American
countries does not help the situation. Brazil, one of the most robust
economies in Latin America, currently only has anti-bribery laws that
hold individual persons liable for bribery acts, but has no equivalent pro-
visions that apply to corporate liability.25
Recently, two U.S. law firms and twelve Latin American law firms
jointly surveyed 439 respondents across fourteen Latin American coun-
tries to try and gauge the amount of corruption that exists in those coun-
tries.26 Two key highlights from the survey are (1) that only 28 percent of
the respondents believe that anti-corruption laws are effective in the
country they work in, and (2) that "[h]alf of all respondents believe that
their company has lost business to competitors making illicit payments in
the region." 27
This information points to the fact that some Latin American countries
still have some ground to cover in order to bring their anti-bribery and
anti-corruption laws up to U.S. standards. In addition, a lack of anti-brib-
ery and anti-corruption laws cultivates an environment in which officials
at the local level expect illicit payments from international companies do-
ing business in their town. 2 8 This correlates with one of the key highlights
from the survey mentioned above: companies that do not partake in the
bribery tactics lose a competitive edge to companies who are willing to
play the game.29
D. A CHANGING LANDSCAPE
As mentioned above, many of the Latin American countries where
American companies do business do not have adequate laws in place to
battle corruption and bribery schemes. Since the increased enforcement
of the FCPA, American businesses are taking matters into their own
hands by making sure their compliance programs are advanced enough to
23. Kleaver & Barton, supra note 21.
24. Romero et al., supra note 17.
25. Matteson Ellis, Lessons from the Mensaldo: Brazil's Largest-Ever Corruption Trial,
CORP. COMPmLANCE INSIGlTS (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.corporatecompliancein-
sights.com/lessons-from-the-mensalao-braziIs-largest-ever-corruption-trial/.
26. Thomas R. Fox, Latin American Anti-Bribery Survey, FCPA CoMPIANCE & E-
ics BiLoc (July 5, 2012, 1:51 AM), http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2012/07/05/latin-
american-anti-bribery-survey/.
27. Id.
28. Ellis, supra note 1.
29. Fox, supra note 26.
ENRIQUE PENA NIETO
detect and handle any corruption that might occur within the corporation
while operating abroad.30
For example, in Mexico, United States-based energy companies have
implemented stable compliance programs that have communicated to
foreign officials that bribes are no longer tolerated; rather, they are to be
frowned upon.3' In a coastal town where many of these companies do
business, local officials know not to expect any extra payment or benefit
because of the repetitive FCPA training by the U.S. energy companies.32
It seems that the uniform action taken by these companies has created an
environment where bribes are not the norm.33
An ever-increasing number of corporations have been upgrading and
implementing advanced compliance programs to deal with the corruption
issues they face in Latin America. 34 In the joint survey mentioned above,
93 percent of the 439 respondents from multinational companies said
their company had taken steps to protect the company from corruption
risk.35 In addition, the survey stated that 75 percent of the respondents
said their company had anti-corruption training.36 The numbers for local
and regional companies were not as good as for multinational companies
- only 75 percent said their company had taken steps to protect the com-
pany from corruption risk, and only 35 percent had anti-corruption train-
ing available for their employees.37
For U.S. companies doing business in Latin America, it is of high im-
portance they understand the risks posed by the region. Latin America is
a growing region full of business opportunities, but the compliance indus-
try in Latin America lags behind. Because of this, U.S. companies must
implement their own compliance programs in order to guard themselves
from the broad provisions of the FCPA.
II. RENEWABLE ENERGY THRIVES IN BRAZIL
In recent times, countries all over the world are beginning to place
great emphasis on using clean energy. Whether it is because of global
warming or to import less energy, clean energy seems to be the wave of
the future, and while some countries have turned away from this trend,
Brazil has welcomed it with open arms.
Brazil has been recognized as a growing leader in the use of renewable
energy. Brazil's Energy Research Company recently released the 2011




34. See Samuel Rubenfield, Latin America Surveys Find Gaps in Corporate Anti-Cor-
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National Energy Balance Report, which provides a detailed analysis of
energy usage in Brazil.38 The most staggering fact from this report is that
nearly 86 percent of Brazil's electricity in 2010 originated from renewable
energy sources.39 This number is quite impressive compared to other ec-
onomic superpowers of the world; for example, the United States was
only at 13 percent.40
Brazil has used a multi-step approach in order to nurture a strong and
efficient renewable energy market. It began with Brazil's implementa-
tion of Law 10.438, also known as the Programme of Incentives for Alter-
native Electricity Sources (PROINFA). 41 Brazil instituted policies that
coordinated with PROINFA to allow renewable energy businesses better
access to funds via their state bank, Brazilian Development Bank
(BNDES). 42 Brazil also uses an auction-based system to award long-term
contracts for energy business. 43 All of these decisions have helped Brazil
build a successful renewable energy sector, a sector that Brazil hopes to
become a world leader in.
A. PROINFA
In 2002, Brazil enacted its flagship act, PROINFA, to cultivate the re-
newable energy sector.44 PROINFA was created by Brazil in response to
the energy crisis of 2001 that plagued the nation and stunted its produc-
tive capacity and growth. 45 PROINFA's main goal is to have 10 percent
of all electricity produced in the country come from renewable energy
sources.46 The program is split into two phases: (1) promoting the use of
38. Charles Kennedy, Renewable Energy Supplied 88.8% of Brazil's Electricity in
2011, OILPRICE.com (June 19, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://oilprice.com/Latest-En-
ergy-News/World-News/Renewable-Energy-Supplied-88.8-of-Brazils-Electricity-
in-2011.html.
39. Balanpo Energitico Nacional Ano Base 2010, MINISIRIO 1E MINAS E; ENERGIA
16 (2011), http://www.forumdeenergia.com.br/nukleo/pub/resultados-pre-ben
2010.pdf.
40. How Much of Our Electricity Is Generated from Renewable Energy?, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. AuMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy-in-brief/article/renewable-electricity.
cfm (last updated June 27, 2012).
41. See Lei No. 10.438, DiAiuo OFICIAi DA UNIAO [D.O.U.], 29.4.2002 (Braz.), avail-
able at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/2002/L1O438compilada.htm.
42. See Stephan Nielsen, Local Content Rule Thwarts Solar Development in Brazil,
RENEWABI.L ENERGY Womui (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.
com/rea/news/article/201 2/08/local-content-rule-thwarts-solar-development-in-
brazil.
43. Jared Anderson, Data Show Brazil's Wind Energy Market Is Wide Open for Busi-
ness, AOL ENERGY (Aug. 27, 2012), http://energy.aol.com/2012/08/27/data-show-
brazil-s-wind-energy-market-is-wide-open-for-business/.
44. Programme of Incentives for Alternative Electricity Sources (PROINFA), WoLiu
RiESouiRCEs INS-T., http://projects.wri.org/sd-pams-database/brazil/programme-in-
centives-alternative-electricity-sources-proinfa (last visited Aug. 28, 2012) [herein-
after PROINFAI.
45. Marcos Chaves Ladeira & Andr6 Vertullo Bernini, Brazil Encourages Alternative
Electric Energy Development: Taking a Closer Look at Brazil's PROINFA Pro-




renewable energy (i.e., wind, biomass, and small hydro) via various incen-
tives and subsidies, and (2) converting those renewable energies from the
first phase into a 10 percent renewable energy share of total annual en-
ergy consumption for Brazil. 4 7
B. BNDES FINANCING
One of the key benefits for businesses looking to undertake renewable
energy projects in Brazil is the generous financing through Brazil's state
bank.48 The projects are financed via the state-bank, BNDES, which is
the chief federal agency for long-term funding of Brazil's development. 49
The BNDES offers long-term financing with low interest rates for renew-
able energy projects-such as wind-if a certain percentage of the parts
for the project are made in Brazil.50 For example, the current require-
ment is 60 percent for wind projects.5 '
C. AUCTION-BASED SYSTEM
Another successful contributor to Brazil's renewable energy growth is
the regulated auction system used to award contracts. 52 These contracts
have been handed out since 200953-using the auction system-and have
been consistently given to several companies since then.54 The wind pro-
ject auctions have attracted several investors because the price of wind
power in the latter half of 2011 fell below the price of electricity gener-
ated by natural gas.5 5 These auctions have created an environment of
competition across the Brazilian energy sector, forcing many companies
to be more competitive with their pricing.56
Brazil's continued success in the renewable energy sector is a culmina-
tion of several different policies synthesizing to create a thriving renewa-
ble energy sector. Brazil's emergence into renewable energy was a fairly
recent and rapid ascension, and it will be interesting to see if Brazil can
sustain that community in the long-term.
47. PROINFA, supra note 44.
48. See Ladeira & Bernini, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. See Christiana Sciaudone, Bank Set to Further Tighten Brazil's Wind Turbine Con-
tent Rules, RECHARGE (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.rechargenews.com/energy/
wind/article320778.ece.
51. See id.
52. See Analysis of the Regulatory Framework in Brazil 2011, GWEC, http://www.
gwec.net/publications/country-reports/analysis-regulatory-framework-brazil/# (last
visited Dec. 13, 2012).
53. Id.
54. See Luiz Claudio S. Campo & Lucio Teixeira, Renewable Energy Recap: Brazil,
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III. MEXICO AND THE NEW PRI: ENRIQUE PENA NIETO
In early July, Enrique Pefia Nieto was chosen by the citizens of Mexico
to be the country's new leader.57 President Pefia Nieto's win over his
counterparts in rival parties was not a big surprise, but the fact that he
belonged to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was.58 The PRI
dominated the political realm in Mexico for seventy-one years until 2000
when Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) beat out the
PRI.59 Looking back on the seventy-one year reign by the PRI, the
party's control in Mexico is remembered for its "corruption, electoral
fraud and occasional bouts of brutal authoritarianism," which is why
many in Mexico are not fully convinced that President Pefia Nieto was
the right answer.60 But President Pefila Nieto recognized this and recently
stated, "[t]he Mexican people have given our party a second opportunity.
We will honor it with results." 6 1 President Pefia Nieto hopes to reaffirm
the people of Mexico's confidence in the PRI by following through with
his campaign promises, which were primarily to stir economic growth via
tax reform and oil privatization and to reduce the vast amount of drug-
related violence that has plagued Mexico for years.62
A. ECONOMic DEVELOPMENT
One of the foundations for Mr. Pefia Nieto's presidential campaign was
his pledge to improve economic development in Mexico and create more
jobs for the Mexican people.63 According to Luis Videgaray, Mr. Pefia
Nieto's campaign manager, the first priority after the July 1 victory was to
pass corporation-aimed tax reform. 64 Mexico currently has one of the
"lowest tax takes in the western hemisphere," and the tax reform that is
envisioned by President Pefila Nieto is one that will help the Mexican gov-
ernment raise more revenue and come more in line with the international
57. Ruben Navarrette Jr., Is Pefia Nieto good news for Mexico?, CNN (July 3, 2012,
2:24 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/03/opinion/navarrette-mexico-election/in-
dex.html.
58. See Pamela K. Starr, Enrique Peflia Nieto: Mexico's new face, L.A. TIMEs (July 6,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/06/opinion/la-oe-starr-mexico-president-
20120706.
59. Navarrette, supra note 57.
60. See Daniel Trotta, Mexican Election Could Return Old Rulers to Power, CIII. TRI3.
(July 1, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-01/news/sns-rt-us-mexico-
electionbre85slg3-2012062991_enrique-pena-nieto-pri-mexican-election.
61. Nacha Cattan, Pena Nieto Prosperity Vow for Mexico Means Mastering the PRI,
BiLoOMBERG (July 2, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-
02/pena-nieto-prosperity-vow-for-mexico-means-mastering-his-party.htmi.
62. See Adam Thomson, Pefia Nieto vows to push on with reforms, FIN. TIMEs (July 3,
2012, 2:07 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8b96ddl6-c4al-1lel-a98c-00144fea
bdcO.html#axzz26UebjMeG (requires registration).
63. Rory Carroll, Enrique Pefia Nieto: hopes, fears and swoons for Mexico's would-be
president, GUARDIAN (June 29, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2012/jun/29/enrique-pena-nieto-mexico-elections.
64. Adam Thomson, Pefia Nieto pledges business tax reform, FIN. TIMES (June 21,
2012, 9:59 AM), http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/0/d6df6b08-baec-1Iel-81eO-00144fea
bdcO.html#axzz24ulfcevk (requires registration).
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standards.65 The plan for President Pefia Nieto is to close some of Mex-
ico's tax loopholes that allow Mexico's biggest companies to not pay their
fair share. 66
In addition to tax reform, President Pefila Nieto hopes to improve the
Mexican economy by adding an element of privatization to Mexico's
state-owned oil industry, currently dominated by Pemex.67 The plan is to
open up the oil sector and provide private capital in order for it to be-
come more efficient and effective. 68 President Pefia Nieto has been in
close talks with the United States about his energy and infrastructure
plans in Mexico, which would include private sector investments in Mex-
ico's oil monopoly and shale gas industry.69
In order to achieve these reforms, President Pefia Nieto will have to
negotiate and compromise across party lines because the PRI failed to
achieve a majority in Congress.70 This will be key if President Pefia Nieto
wants to achieve his oil privatization reform pledge, because a constitu-
tional amendment will likely be required.71 The Mexican Constitution
states, "[i]n the Nation is vested the direct ownership of all natural re-
sources of the continental shelf and the submarine shelf of the islands
. . . ."72 In order for a constitutional amendment to be passed, a two-
thirds majority will be necessary, which the PRI does not currently
hold.7 3 One of the primary reasons for a shift from PAN back to the PRI
is the immense drug-violence in Mexico, which has resulted in more than
55,000 deaths since 2007.74 President Pefia Nieto pledged during his cam-
paign to create an elite federal security force that will coordinate with
local police to track down drug traffickers.75 In order to do this, Presi-
dent Pefia Nieto needs to acquire the cooperation of the state governors
and convince them to adjust their security institutions to combat drug
violence.76
It seems that President Pefia Nieto's campaign pledges of drug and
economy policy reform are all contingent on reaching out to other party
leaders for cooperation. President Pefila Nieto will need to come through
on at least some of his campaign pledges if the PRI is to reassure its new
image of modern democracy with Mexican doubters.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Andres Oppenheimer, Mexico will not return to third world foreign policy,
MIAMI HiRAto (July 4, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/04/2880840/
mexico-will-not-return-to-3rd.html.
68. See Thomson, supra note 64.
69. See Oppenheimer, supra note 67.
70. Cattan, supra note 61.
71. Id.
72. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 27,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) (emphasis
supplied).
73. Cattan, supra note 61.
74. Trotta, supra note 60.
75. Cattan, supra note 61.
76. Id.
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